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COMMENTARY
Pleau-Sharing
JONAH J. HORWITZ†
Federalism is a hot topic at the moment. With the
Supreme Court having just ruled on the most significant
conflict between the states and the national government
since the New Deal,1 the issue has greater currency with the
public than it has had in decades. As with many such
debates, however, the struggle over healthcare reform is not
really about federalism. The Commerce Clause has simply
provided a convenient constitutional garb for advocates on
all sides. By and large, such advocates do not purport to be
centrally motivated by a concern for states’ freedom from
national interference. Rather, they talk about the freedom
of the individual (the law’s critics), the needs of the indigent
(the law’s defenders), and fiscal responsibility (both). That is
not to say that the healthcare debate is a sham. No doubt a
healthy discussion can be had over the constitutional
balance of power between the states and the federal
government, even when the combatants’ motivations have
more to do with other matters. Perhaps the passions of the
participants sharpen the constitutional debate. Indeed,
perhaps some considerations that seem removed from the
relationship between the nation and the states are actually
not so removed.2
† BA with honors, 2006, Swarthmore College. JD cum laude, Order of the
Coif, 2010, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
2. See, e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (holding that the
commerce clause affords individuals a cause of action against states interfering
with their right to engage in interstate commerce).
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Nevertheless, there are surely times when a
conversation about federalism should be focused on
federalism, times when we should return to the roots of the
concept and revisit the fundamental question of what
powers are granted to which sovereign. Such conversations
are most fruitfully had about powers traditionally reserved
to one government and encroached upon by another. For in
that instance, unlike cases where courts wrestle with
uniquely modern activity that does not fit neatly into the
historical federalist paradigm,3 we can clearly see the
evolution of our federalist system, and we can thoughtfully
consider whether or not we like the direction we are headed.
There are few areas more traditionally dominated by
one sovereign over the other than the prosecution of
commonplace crimes.4 And there are few judicial decisions
that more blithely disregard that tradition than the recent
First Circuit decision, United States v. Pleau.5 The majority
opinion in that case is a stark reminder of just how far the
conventional distinctions between the sovereigns have
collapsed. It is also a stark reminder of how such collapses
can occur almost invisibly, through erosion and passing
remarks rather than landmark cases and seminal holdings.
Some cursory background. In 2010, Jason Pleau robbed
and murdered a gas station manager who was making a
bank deposit in Rhode Island.6 While in state custody for a
parole violation, a federal grand jury indicted him for
robbery affecting commerce and use of a firearm during and
in relation to a crime of violence resulting in death.7 The
federal government sought custody of Pleau to charge him
with the offenses, which potentially carried with them a
penalty of death.8 Because Lincoln Chafee, the Governor of
3. See, e.g., United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004)
(applying commerce clause jurisprudence to the Internet).
4. See, e.g., Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9, 20 (2006)
(“[R]espondents’ Hobbes Act interpretation broadens the Act’s scope beyond
what case law has assumed. It would federalize much ordinary criminal
behavior, ranging from simple assault to murder, behavior that typically is the
subject of state, not federal, prosecution.”).
5. United States v. Pleau, 680 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (en banc).
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id.
8. Id. The federal government has since announced it will seek the death
penalty for Pleau. See Katie Mulvaney, State of R.I. Seeks U.S. Supreme Court
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Rhode Island, is opposed to capital punishment, he refused
to hand Pleau over.9 By the time the case reached the First
Circuit, Pleau involved a host of complicated jurisdictional
and procedural issues that are not centrally relevant to this
commentary.10 Its reference to the principal concern
examined
here—the
increasing,
and
increasingly
surreptitious,
federalization
of
ordinary
criminal
prosecution—is mentioned only in passing. Which is, in a
sense, exactly the point.
Here is the passing remark. The majority opinion,
written by the eminent jurist Judge Boudin for himself and
two other members of the en banc court, announced: “That
there is an overriding federal interest in prosecuting
defendants indicted on federal crimes needs no citation . . .
.”11 In a scholarly opinion published in a high-profile case for
a respected court and by a prominent judge, it is no small
matter to declare that a proposition does not require any
authority. It is puzzling, therefore, that Judge Boudin
would find it unnecessary to support this proposition, which
is far from self-evident.
As an initial matter, it is important to note that this
essay does not purport to answer the dispositive questions
at issue in the dispute between the United States and
Rhode Island, or those at issue in the dispute between the
majority and the dissent. Those questions entail complex
matters of statutory analysis and habeas jurisprudence too
thorny to untangle in the short space allotted. And, in any
event, it is clear that the concern articulated here cannot
resolve the controversy. For, as observed below, even the
dissent does not dispute the proposition quoted above and
critiqued here. That too is part of the very problem under
consideration: that even a scathing dissent written to
defend state sovereignty in one narrow case accepts without
comment a wildly sweeping condemnation of state

Review in Pleau Death Penalty Case, PROVIDENCE J. (Aug. 21, 2012), http://news.
providencejournal.com/breaking-news/2012/08/state-seeks-us.html.
9. Pleau, 680 F.3d at 3.
10. Many of the issues relate to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, a
compact between the separate states and the federal government concerning the
exchange of prisoners between different jurisdictions. See id. at 3-5.
11. Id. at 7.
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sovereignty in a much broader context. The problem, in a
nutshell, is one of tone.
“That there is an overriding federal interest in
prosecuting defendants indicted on federal crimes” is a
freestanding proposition on a high level of generality.12
Judge Boudin, a careful drafter, included within the
sentence no indication that it bore any close connection to
the legal issues in the case at bar. He did not say, “there is
an overriding federal interest in prosecuting defendants
indicted on federal crimes in a dispute over the terms of the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers” or “in a dispute over
the proper application of habeas law.” With presumed
calculation, he said simply that “there is an overriding
federal interest in prosecuting defendants indicted on
federal crimes.”13 Period. The assumption that Judge Boudin
meant what he said as he said it is further bolstered by the
fact that he saw fit to announce the lack of authority, and
confirmed by the fact that the dissent tacitly treated the
statement as an abstract (and true) proposition, rather than
a necessary building-block of the majority’s flawed
reasoning.
Now, in a different case, it could very well be true that
the proposition is so obvious as to render a citation
superfluous. Imagine, for example, a criminal defendant
complaining to an assistant U.S. attorney that he should
not be forced to answer for his offense because he had
parental obligations, spousal obligations, or business
obligations. Then it would make sense to respond,
scoffingly, that an overriding federal interest eclipsed his
own. Or, to bring the matter slightly closer to plausibility,
imagine an elected official urging a federal judge to dismiss
an indictment because it would impair his ability to serve
the people. The judge would likely be on firm ground to
shoot the motion down, because there is an overriding
federal interest in seeing corrupt politicians removed from
office and punished.
But what exactly does it mean for there to be an
overriding federal interest in transplanting a single, fairly
unremarkable defendant from a state prison to a federal
prison? The only explanation with any persuasive force is
12. Id.
13. Id.
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that different penalties will be available to Pleau’s federal
prosecutors than to Rhode Island. Indeed, that is the
Governor’s stated reason for declining the federal request in
the first place: that he does not believe in the death penalty,
and that the Department of Justice could pursue one if it so
chooses. It is difficult to see, however, how the federal
government’s interest in seeing Pleau, the robber and
murderer of a gas station manager, die by the hand of an
executioner carrying out a federal death sentence rather
than die during or after a lengthy stay in a state prison,
could meaningfully be described as overriding, let alone how
it could be described as such in passing and with no
authority. Nor can it be ignored that the federal government
very seldom executes anyone in today’s day and age14 and
generally reserves the punishment for the perpetrators of
truly egregious offenses.15 If there is any proposition in the
opinion that required a citation, it would be this one!
Ultimately, Judge Boudin cannot really mean “[t]hat
there is an overriding federal interest in prosecuting
defendants indicted on federal crimes” in such a way as to
be applicable to Pleau. What he must mean instead, in
keeping with the tenor of the increasing federalization of
run-of-the-mill crimes, is that there is an overriding federal
interest in the federal government calling the shots in
Pleau’s prosecution, rather than Rhode Island and
regardless of what Rhode Island would presumably do to
him. In other words, there is an overriding federal interest
in a federal attorney (not a state attorney) charging Pleau
under federal statutes (not state statutes); and a federal
interest in a federal judge (not a state judge) sentencing him
to a federal prison (not a state prison). It matters not that
the process and end result would likely be very similar. The
point is that the federal government is the federal
government. If it wants Jason Pleau, it gets him.
14. See, e.g., Michele Martinez Campbell, Federalism and Capital
Punishment: New England Stories, 36 VT. L. REV. 81, 81 (2011) (“Federal death
sentences represent only 0.53% of death sentences imposed in the United
States.”).
15. Timothy McVeigh, for instance, one of the men responsible for the
Oklahoma City bombing, was one of the last people executed by the federal
government. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, Executions of Federal Prisoners
(Since 1927), http://www.bop.gov/about/history/execchart.jsp (last visited Sept.
19, 2012).
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Again, this critique is not meant to attack the result
reached by the First Circuit. The case law may support the
majority, and more importantly the Constitution may. It is
hard to challenge Judge Boudin’s assertion that the
“Supremacy Clause operates in only one direction and has
nothing to do with comity.”16 Maybe that fact alone is
sufficient to justify the outcome. But, to borrow the Judge’s
own phrase, that proposition has nothing to do with the
federal government’s interests, overriding or not. On the
contrary, it is essentially a way of saying that it doesn’t
matter whether the federal government has an overriding
interest. All it needs is to pretend it has one, to say: we
want Pleau, give him to us.
Interestingly, the vigorous dissent penned by Judge
Torruella and joined by Judge Thompson accuses the
majority of “unnecessary federal arrogance” but cites for its
charge the majority’s line about the Supremacy Clause
running in only one direction, not its fabrication of an
overriding federal interest.17 The majority’s view of the
Supremacy Clause may be arrogant; it also happens to be
accurate. Its view of the overriding federal interest, on the
other hand, is both arrogant and untrue. One wonders
whether the dissent here is implicitly conceding the fact
that it makes no difference whether the federal government
has an overriding interest in Pleau. After all, the dissent
does not counter the majority’s claim of an overriding
federal interest; it simply rebuts its reading of the law.
There is certainly nothing improper in Judge Torruella’s
tack in that regard. The duty of a dissenting judge is to
express his reasoning for why he disagrees on the result,
and reasoning in the majority not necessary for the result is
reasoning that does not demand a response.
Still, one wishes for honesty if nothing else. If we have
reached the point where the federal government can seize a
prisoner from a state on a flimsy pretext that flies in the
face of history, practice, and common sense, our Article III
judiciary should so inform us. We have a right to know the
current status of our constitutional system, particularly
when it seems to have shifted so dramatically in an area—
criminal law—of crucial importance to all society. A petition
for certiorari in United States v. Pleau has already been
16. Pleau, 680 F.3d at 6.
17. Id. at 12 n.17 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
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filed with the Supreme Court, and the case is therefore at
the court's doorstep.18 Relatively free as it is from the fierce
ideological emotions at play in the healthcare litigation, it
will hopefully provide the high court an opportunity to tell
us where we stand, for good or ill.

18. See Pleau v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/
case-files/cases/pleau-v-united-states/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).

